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AbstractÐA distributed system is said to be self-stabilizing if it converges to safe states regardless of its initial state. In this paper we
present our results of using symbolic model checking to verify distributed algorithms against the self-stabilizing property. In general, the
most difficult problem with model checking is state explosion; it is especially serious in verifying the self-stabilizing property, since it
requires the examination of all possible initial states. So far applying model checking to self-stabilizing algorithms has not been
successful due to the problem of state explosion. In order to overcome this difficulty, we propose to use symbolic model checking for
this purpose. Symbolic model checking is a verification method which uses Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) to compactly
represent state spaces. Unlike other model checking techniques, this method has the advantage that most of its computations do not
depend on the initial states. We show how to verify the correctness of algorithms by means of SMV, a well-known symbolic model
checker. By applying the proposed approach to several algorithms in the literature, we demonstrate empirically that the state spaces of
self-stabilizing algorithms can be represented by OBDDs very efficiently. Through these case studies, we also demonstrate the
usefulness of the proposed approach in detecting errors.
Index TermsÐSelf-stabilization, automatic verification, symbolic model checking, distributed algorithms.
æ
1 INTRODUCTION
ADISTRIBUTED system is said to be self-stabilizing if itsatisfies the following two properties: 1) Convergen-
ceÐthe system reaches a safe state regardless of its initial
state, and 2) closureÐonce the system reaches a safe state, it
continues to be within the set of safe states. The idea of self-
stabilization was first introduced to computer science by
Dijkstra [5]. This idea, which originally had a very narrow
scope of application, has attracted much research interest in
recent years (cf. [22]). In general, a self-stabilizing system
has two useful properties: 1) It need not be initialized, and
2) it can recover from transient faults that may change its
state. These properties are very useful in distributed
environments where no centralized control exists.
In this paper, we discuss automatic verification of self-
stabilizing algorithms. Automatic verification is relatively
unexplored in the field of self-stabilizing algorithms, due to
its awkwardness.
There are two distinct traditions in automatic verifica-
tion. One is mechanical theorem proving, and the other is model
checking. The first approach has been discussed by several
researchers in the context of self-stabilizing algorithms.
In [19], Prasetya verified a self-stabilizing minimum-cost
routing algorithm using the HOL proof checking system [9].
In [20], Qadeer and Shankar applied PVS [17] to prove the
correctness of Dijkstra's self-stabilizing ring algorithm [5].
Recently, Kulkarni et al. [15] also proved the correctness of
the Dijkstra's algorithm using PVS in a different fashion.
Generally, mechanical theorem proving is a highly power-
ful and flexible approach. For example, it can be used for
reasoning about infinite state systems. Unfortunately, this
approach can involve generating and proving many
lemmas to verify the correctness of systems. Although this
process can be automated to some extent by means of proof
checking systems, proofs must still be constructed mainly
by hand. Consequently, mechanical theorem proving can be
performed only by experts who have considerable experi-
ence in logical reasoning.
The second approach to automatic verification, the
model checking, is the process of exploring a finite state
space to determine whether or not a given property holds.
This is often the easiest way to verify distributed algo-
rithms; however, it is more limited. This leads to dis-
advantages, such as only being able to apply it to finite state
systems, and it is impractical when the state space is very
large, even though it is finite. The latter problem, which
often occurs when the system being verified has many
components, is usually referred to as the state explosion
problem.
At the same time, model checking has two remarkable
advantages; first, it is fully automatic and its application
does not require the user to have mathematical knowledge
such as theorem proving. Second, when the design fails to
satisfy a desired property, the process of model checking
produces a counterexample that demonstrates a behavior
which invalidates the property. Therefore, the use of model
checking can be useful for algorithm designers who need to
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validate distributed algorithms, especially in early stages of
development.
However, since the state explosion problem is especially
serious in verifying a self-stabilizing algorithm, applying
model checking to them has not been successful so far (note
that since any state can be the initial state, the set of the
reachable states is exactly the same as the Cartesian product
of sets of states of all components). As far as we know, the
only work that reports the results of using model checking
for verifying self-stabilization is the one by Shukla et al.
[23]. For two distributed algorithms, they verified whether
the system converges to safe states from a given initial state,
using a software tool called SPIN [12]. Nevertheless, their
method cannot be directly used for verifying whether this
property holds for all possible initial states. This problem
can be alleviated by minor modifications that allow any
state to be an initial state. As shown later, however, these
modifications render the method infeasible even for small
systems.
To overcome the problem of applying model checking to
self-stabilizing algorithms, we propose to use CTL symbolic
model checking (symbolic model checking, for short). This
method controls the state explosion problem by using
Boolean functions to implicitly represent the state space.
Since Boolean functions can be often represented by Ordered
Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) very compactly, the
symbolic model checking method can reduce the memory
and time required for analysis. By manipulating the
Boolean functions, the method can determine whether a
system meets a given property that is specified using CTL
[3], a branching time temporal logic.
Compared to other model checking approaches, the
symbolic model checking method has several features that
are appropriate for verifying self-stabilizing algorithms.
First, since most of the computations required by the
method do not depend on reachability of states, the
property that any state can be the initial state never
becomes an obstacle to verification. Second, the self-
stabilizing property can be expressed by a simple CTL
formula. Third, as will be empirically shown later, the state
spaces of self-stabilizing systems can be represented very
compactly by using OBDDs. Besides, a symbolic model
checking tool called SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) [16] is
widely available.
In this paper, we investigate how we can verify
algorithms against the self-stabilizing property by using
SMV. To illustrate the feasibility of our approach, we
describe the results of applying it to several algorithms
proposed in the literature. During the verification process,
we found an error in one of these algorithms [26].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
the next section, we describe the concept of self-stabilizing
algorithms; in Section 3, we briefly explain symbolic model
checking and the symbolic model checker SMV. In Section 4,
we present how to verify distributed algorithms against the
self-stabilizing property by using SMV. By applying the
approach to several algorithms, we demonstrate its applic-
ability in Section 5. For comparative purposes, we show the
results of using SPIN, a model checker based on explicit
state enumeration, for validation of a self-stabilizing
algorithm in Section 6; and we conclude our paper with a
brief summary in Section 7.
2 SELF-STABILIZING ALGORITHMS
2.1 Models and Definitions
We consider a distributed system that consists of
n processes, p0; p1; p2;    ; pnÿ1. For convenience, the sub-
scripts on pi are assumed to be modulo n. The topology of
the system is modeled by an undirected graph of which
each vertex corresponds to a process. Process pi can
communicate with another process, pj, if pi and pj are
adjacent to each other on the graph.
We consider two models of communication: In the state-
reading model, each process can directly read the internal
state of its neighboring processes; in the link-register model,
processes can communicate with each other only by using
separate registers. In the latter model, there are two
registers Rij and Rji for each adjacent pair of processes pi
and pj. Process pj can read the state of Rij but not the state
of pi itself, and only pi can change the state of Rij. We call
Rij and Rji the output register and the input register of pi for
pj, respectively. Thus, Rij is the input register of pj for pi.
The number of registers is denoted by l.
We assume that the number of the states of each
component (process or register) of the system is finite and
we define the global state of the system as the vector of the
states of all components. Therefore, the set of all global
states, denoted by G, is given as follows:
. the state-reading model G  Q0 Q1     Qnÿ1,
and
. the link-register model
G  Q0 Q1     Qnÿ1 O0 O1     Olÿ1;
where Qi0  i  nÿ 1 and Oi0  i  lÿ 1 denote the set
of states of pi and the set of states of the i 1th register,
respectively.
A distributed algorithm specifies a transition relation for
each process pi. Based on the transition relation, pi reads the
states of its neighboring processes or its input registers,
calculates the next local state, and updates, if needed, its
output registers in each step of execution. A distributed
algorithm thus specifies the behavior of the system, and in
this paper, we limit our discussion to deterministic
algorithms.
Concerning selection of processes to run, two types of
daemons are considered: the central daemon (c-daemon) and
the distributed daemon (d-daemon). If the c-daemon is
assumed, then only one process is selected to run at a time,
while an arbitrary set of processes is selected to run under
the d-daemon. For either type of daemon, we assume it to
be fair, that is, we assume that each process is selected
infinitely often. We use g!U g0 by express the fact that
processes in U fp0; p1;    ; pnÿ1g are selected at g 2 G and
yield g0 2 G by their parallel execution. (If U is not important
or is clear, we may omit it.) An infinite sequence of global
states g0g1g2    is called a computation iff for every i 0
there is Ui fp0; p1;    ; pnÿ1g such that gi!Ui gi1. A
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computation is said to be fair if it is produced by a fair
daemon.
Self-stabilization is defined as follows: Let L be the set of
the legitimate (or safe) states in which the system performs
correct execution. A distributed system is said to be self-
stabilizing if it satisfies the following two properties:
1. ConvergenceÐfor any global state g0 2 G and any
fair computation g0g1g2    starting with g0, there is
an integer k 0 such that gk 2 L, and
2. ClosureÐfor any global state g 2 L, g! g0 implies
g0 2 L.
An algorithm can be defined as self-stabilizing in a
corresponding manner, thus, a self-stabilizing algorithm
specifies a self-stabilizing system.
2.2 Illustrative Example
Here we take Dijkstra's K-state mutual exclusion algorithm
as an illustrative example [5]. Consider a distributed system
that consists of n processes connected in the form of a ring,
as shown in Fig. 1a. We assume the state-reading model and
the existence of the c-daemon, and we define a privilege of a
process as its ability to change its current state. This ability
is based on a Boolean predicate that consists of its current
state and the state of one of its neighboring processes.
We then define the legitimate states as those in which the
following two properties hold: 1) exactly one process has a
privilege, and 2) every process will eventually have a
privilege. These properties correspond to a form of mutual
exclusion, because the privileged process can be regarded
as the only process that is allowed in its critical section.
In the K-state algorithm, the state of each process is in
f0; 1; 2;    ; K ÿ 1g, where K is an integer larger than or
equal to n. For any process pi, we use the symbols S and L
to denote its state and the state of its neighbor piÿ1,
respectively, and process p0 is treated differently from all
other processes. The K-state algorithm is described below.
. process p0
if L  SfS : S  1modK; g
. process pii  1; 2;    ; nÿ 1
if L 6 SfS : L; g.
Fig. 1b shows part of a computation of the system with
three processes and K  4. Although every process has a
privilege initially, after two steps the system reaches a state
where only one process is privileged. Thereafter, there is
exactly one privileged process in the system and each
process has privilege infinitely often. The computation
shown in Fig. 1b is only an example, since the running
processes are selected arbitrarily by the daemon assumed.
Nevertheless, one can prove that by using this algorithm the
system converges such legitimate states regardless of the
initial state and computation [6].
3 SYMBOLIC MODEL CHECKING
Model checking is the process of exploring a finite state
space to determine whether or not a given property holds.
The major problem of model checking is that the state
spaces arising from practical problems are often extremely
large, generally making exhaustive exploration not feasible.
A promising approach to this problem is the use of
symbolic representations of the state space. In CTL symbolic
model checking (symbolic model checking for short), Boolean
functions represented by Ordered Binary Decision Dia-
grams (OBDDs) are used to represent the state space,
instead of explicit adjacency-lists. This can reduce drama-
tically the memory and time required because OBDDs
represent many frequently occurring Boolean functions
very compactly.
Consider a set of Boolean vectors B  ftrue; falsegc. Then
any subset of B can be represented by a Boolean function
(say B) with c Boolean variables such that the vector x 2 B
is in the subset if and only if Bx is true. Since B 
ftrue; falsegc has 2c elements, 2c states can thus be handled
by using c Boolean variables. The transition relation is also
represented by a Boolean function F with 2c variables such
that there is a transition from x to y if and only if F x; y is
true (x; y 2 B). Since the Boolean function F can be defined
without any information on reachability, it can be con-
structed regardless of the initial states.
The correctness property to be verified is specified in
CTL (Computational Tree Logic) [3]. CTL is a branching-
time temporal logic, extending propositional logic with
temporal operators that express how propositions change
their truth values over time. Here we only use three
temporal operators: AG, AF, and AX. The formula AG p
holds in state s if p holds in all states along all computation
paths (i.e., sequences of states) starting from s, while the
formula AF p holds in state s if p holds in some state
along all computation paths starting from s. The formula
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Fig. 1. (a) A ring network. (b) An example of a computation of the K-state algorithm (n  3, K  4).
AX p holds in state s if p holds in all the states that can be
reached from s in exactly one step.1 An atomic proposition
is a CTL formula. If f1 and f2 are CTL formulae, then so are
:f1, f1 ^ f2, AF f1, AG f1, and AX f1.
In the process of symbolic model checking, a given
CTL formula is evaluated with respect to all the initial states
as follows: First, the set of all states where the given
property holds is computed from the transition relation
function F . This is done by fixed-point iterative techniques
which manipulate Boolean functions encoded as OBDDs.
(See [2], [16] for details.) Finally, whether the set obtained
contains all initial states is determined. If it contains all the
initial states, then the system meets the correctness
property.
Only the final phase of the model checking process is
thus related to the initial states, and most of the computa-
tions required do not depend on the state space reachable
from the initial states. Consequently, this characteristic can
be a drawback of the symbolic model checking, since the
states that are never reached must be explored. However, in
the case of self-stabilizing systems, this property never
becomes a factor that worsens the verification performance,
because all states are necessarily reachable.
4 VERIFYING SELF-STABILIZATION USING SMV
4.1 SMV
SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) [16] is a software tool for
symbolic model checking; it is publicly available and has
been especially successful in verifying hardware systems. In
this section, we describe how we can use SMV to verify self-
stabilizing algorithms.
In SMV, a system (or an algorithm) to be verified is
described in a special language called the SMV language. We
refer to a system description written in the SMV language
as an SMV program. An SMV program is divided into one or
more modules, each of which specifies a finite state
machine. Each module contains variable declarations to
determine its state space and descriptions of the initial state
and transition relation of the machine.
Variable declarations are preceded by the keyword VAR.
The type associated with a variable can be Boolean or an
enumerated type. The transition relation is described by a
collection of parallel assignments to the next version of the
variables. Assignments of initial values and next values to
the variables are preceded by the keyword ASSIGN. Initial
states are assigned by specifying the initial values of the
variables using the expression init(x), where x is a
variable. The expression next(x) is used to refer to the
variable x in the next state.
For example, consider a finite state machine that has
three states, say s1, s2, and s3, and suppose that s1 is the
initial state and that the state nondeterministically changes
at every move. This machine is represented in the SMV
language as follows:
MODULE p
VAR state : {s1, s2, s3}
ASSIGN init(state) := s1;
next(state) := {s1, s2, s3};
For the details of the syntax and semantics of the SMV
language, the readers are referred to [16].
4.2 Describing Algorithms in the SMV Language
Here we explain how to represent a distributed algorithm in
the SMV language and how to verify it against the self-
stabilizing property using SMV. For this purpose, we take
the K-state algorithm as an example, assuming that the
c-daemon exists. (The d-daemon will be discussed in the
next subsection.) Fig. 2 shows the SMV program that
represents the K-state algorithm where n  3 and K  4.
4.2.1 Interaction between Processes
The interaction between processes is specified in the main
module. The SMV language allows modular hierarchical
descriptions and definition of reusable components. The
main module defines the interaction of other modules at a
lower level, each of which represents the behavior of a
process.
The main module in Fig. 2 declares three processes, p0;
p1, and p2. The behavior of p0 and that of pii  1; 2 are
specified by modules type_p and type_q, respectively.
The main module also specifies that each process pii 
0; 1; 2 can refer to the value of a variable state of another
process piÿ1. This corresponds to the fact that the processes
are connected in the form of a ring. (As described later,
network topologies other than rings can be specified in a
similar way.)
In the main module in this program, the three processes
are associated with the keyword process. In SMV, such
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1. Operators G, F, and X mean globally, sometime in the future, and next
time, respectively. In CTL, these operators must be preceded by a path
quantifier which is either A (for all computation paths) or E (for some
computation path).
Fig. 2. An SMV program for the K-state algorithm (n  3;K  4).
instances of modules are not allowed to run simultaneously.
That is, at every step, at most one of them is nondetermi-
nistically selected and allowed to update its own state. The
SMV program in Fig. 2 thus represents the existence of the
c-daemon, which arbitrarily selects one process at a time for
running.
4.2.2 Processes
As stated above, the behavior of each process is expressed
by a module in the SMV program. The next local state of the
process is determined depending on its current local state
and the local states of its adjacent processes or registers in
the network.
In modules type_p and type_q in Fig. 2, variable
state denotes the state of the corresponding process pi,
while L aliases variable state of its left neighbor piÿ1, that
is, it denotes the state of the left neighbor.
The keyword DEFINE is used to associate a symbol with
a commonly used expression. In type_p and type_q, it is
used to assign expressions (state = L) and !(state = L)
to symbol priv, respectively. Therefore, priv takes the
truth value iff the corresponding process has a privilege.
(! represents negation.)
The value of next(state), i.e., the next state of the
process changes depending on the values of state and L as
follows. The value of a case expression is determined by
the first expression on the right hand side of a ª:º such that
the condition on the left hand side is true. Thus, for process
p0, if priv is true, then the result of the expression is
(state + 1) mod 4; otherwise, it is state, which means
the value of state does not change. (1 and 0 represent the
truth value and the false value, respectively.)
The keyword FAIRNESS and a CTL formula force SMV
to verify only computation paths where the CTL formula
becomes true infinitely often. Each process has a special
variable running which is true iff that process is currently
being executed. Thus, by adding the declaration
FAIRNESS running
to each process, we can limit computation paths to be
verified to those in which running of every process has the
truth value infinitely often. In other words, we thus force
every process to be selected to run infinitely often. Clearly
this models a fair daemon.
4.2.3 Initial States
In order to determine whether or not the system is self-
stabilizing, it is necessary to examine all possible initial
states. SMV allows multiple initial states, and we can easily
specify that the initial state can be any state.
For example, the state of a process is an integer ranging
from 0 to K ÿ 1 in the K-state algorithm. We can specify that
its initial value can take any value within the domain as
follows (K  4).
init(state) := {0, 1, 2, 3};
The above expression means that the possible initial values
of state are 0, 1, 2, and 3. By specifying the initial values of
all variables in this way, we can represent the fact that the
system can take any initial state.
4.2.4 The Self-Stabilizing Property
As stated above, a self-stabilizing algorithm is defined as
one that meets the convergence and closure properties.
Now suppose that the predicate that identifies the
legitimate states is expressed by CTL formula legitimate.
Then,
. the convergence property holds iff CTL formula AF
legitimate holds in every global state, and
. the closure property holds iff CTL formula
legitimate! AX legitimate holds in every global
state.
As a result, the self-stabilizing property is expressed by
CTL formula AF legitimate ^ (legitimate! AX legitimate).
(Note that the CTL formula is evaluated with respect to all
initial states, i.e., all global states.)
Sometimes it is clear that the closure property holds from
the definition of the legitimate states. In that case, we need
to consider the convergence property only. In Section 5, we
will discuss such cases.
In an SMV program, the property to be checked is
preceded by the keyword SPEC, as follows. (& and | stand
for logical and and logical or, respectively.)
SPEC AF legitimate & (legitimate
-> AX legitimate)
In the K-state algorithm, a global state is legitimate iff
1) there is exactly one privileged process in that state, and
2) every process will be eventually privileged in any
computation starting with that state. Let privi represent
the fact that process pi has a privilege. Each of the two
conditions can be written in CTL as_
0inÿ1
privi ^
^
j 6i
0jnÿ1
:privj
and ^
0inÿ1
AF privi;
respectively. In Fig. 2, the above two CTL formulae are
denoted by symbols condition1 and condition2,
respectively. Hence, legitimate can be written as condi-
tion1 & condition2.
4.3 Dealing with the Distributed Daemon
When the d-daemon is assumed, describing algorithms in
the SMV language is slightly more complicated than the
case of the c-daemon. Fig. 3 shows the SMV program for the
K-state algorithm under the d-daemon.
To allow multiple processes to run at the same time,
keyword process is not used in Fig. 3. In SMV, a module
that is not associated with keyword process is always
running. In other words, all processes are selected to run at
any given time. Obviously, this is not adequate for
representing the d-daemon.
To select an arbitrary set of processes to run, we use
an additional variable run in each module. This variable
takes a value of either 0 or 1, and the value is randomly
selected at any given time. Using the case expressions, we
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allow each process to actually run only when the value of
run is 1.
We verified the K-state algorithm assuming 3  n  8
and K  n 1. Except for the case of n  8 and the
d-daemon, the verification was completed within a fairly
admissible amount of time and the verification result
showed that the self-stabilizing property holds. Table 1
shows the performance of the model checking procedure
for this example in terms of the verification time, the
maximum number of OBDD nodes used at any given time,
and the number of nodes of the OBDD that represents the
transition relation. (All measurements were performed on a
Sun SS20 workstation with 160Mbyte memory. An NA in
the table indicates that data was not collected since the
verification was not completed within 10 hours.) The table
also contains the number of the global states of the system
(i.e., jGj). For the K-state algorithm, it is given by Kn, since
each process has K states.
In this table, one can see that when the number of
processes is large, the size of the OBDD that represents the
transition relation is extremely smaller than the size of
global states. It can also be seen that the time and OBDD
nodes used under the assumption of the d-daemon are
much larger than the case of the c-daemon. This is because
additional variables are used to model the d-daemon, thus
leading to a larger state space to be explored.
5 CASE STUDIES
5.1 Example 1: Mutual Exclusion in Special
Networks
The proposed approach can also handle network topologies
other than rings. Here we take Ghosh's mutual exclusion
algorithm as an example [7]. This algorithm works in the
special networks as shown in Fig. 4 (m  2) and needs only
two states, 0 and 1, per process. We let si denote the state of
process i. The algorithm is presented below. The symbol b
represents a binary value.
. process p0
if s0; s1  :b; bfs0 : b; g
. process p2iÿ1i  1; 2; 3;    ;mÿ 1
if s2iÿ2; s2iÿ1; s2i; s2i1  b; b; b;:bfs2iÿ1 : :b; g
. process p2ii  1; 2; 3;    ;mÿ 1
if s2iÿ2; s2iÿ1; s2i; s2i1  b; b;:b; bfs2i : b; g
. process p2mÿ1
if s2mÿ1; s2mÿ2  b; bfs2mÿ1 : :b; g.
Based on the verification approach presented in the
previous section, we wrote SMV programs that represent
the algorithm. Fig. 5 shows the SMV program for the
c-daemon. The main module specifies the network topol-
ogy with m  3. (The DEFINE and SPEC parts in the main
module are omitted, since they are the same as the K-state
algorithm.)
We performed verification of this algorithm under both
the c-daemon and the d-daemon. Table 2 shows the
verification results and the performance of the model
checking procedure for this example in terms of the
verification time and the maximum number of OBDD
nodes used at any given time. The table also contains the
size of the OBDD that represents the transition relation and
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Fig. 3. SMV program for the K-state algorithm under the d-daemon
(n  3;K  4).
TABLE 1
Verification Results and Performance for the K-State Algorithm (K  n 1)
the number of global states of the system. For this
algorithm, the number of the global states is given by 2n
since each process has only two states.
Unexpectedly, the time and the maximum size of OBDDs
used under the d-daemon were smaller than those values
used under the c-daemon, when the number of processes
exceeded 10. The reason is that in the case of the d-daemon,
the transition relation has a relatively compact OBDD
representation.
This phenomenon is consistent with the results of
comparing two plausible models of asynchronous circuits
[16]. These two models are called the interleaving model and
the simultaneous model. In the former model, only one state
component changes value in a given transition, while any or
all state variables may change state in the latter model. They
are thus analogous to the c-daemon and the d-daemon,
respectively. In [16], it is shown that OBDD-based techni-
ques tend to perform better on the simultaneous model,
especially when the number of variables is large. Since the
addition of variable run, which is unnecessary for the
c-daemon model, degrades the verification performance,
this phenomenon was observed only when the number of
processes was sufficiently large.
Unlike Ghosh's algorithm, other self-stabilizing algo-
rithms discussed elsewhere in the paper do not have such
similarities to hardware circuits, since variables in these
algorithms have a much larger domain than a Boolean
variable has. Actually, such a phenomenon was not
observed in the verification of these algorithms.
5.2 Example 2: Leader Election on Uniform Rings
Both of the two algorithms discussed before are used for
achieving mutual exclusion. In the rest of the section, we
show that the proposed approach can also be applied to
algorithms used to solve other problems.
In this section, we discuss the leader election problem on
rings, which is the problem of selecting one process as a
leader on a ring where no distinguished process initially
exists. Consider a ring that consists of n processes,
p0; p1;    ; pnÿ1, that are connected in this order; and assume
that the ring is uniform; that is, all the processes on the ring
have no identifiers and execute the same algorithm.
Subscripts are thus used only for explanation purposes,
and processes cannot make use of them.
In [13], Huang proposed a self-stabilizing leader election
algorithm that works on rings of primal size under the
c-daemon. In the algorithm, the state of each process is in
f0; 1; 2;    ; nÿ 1g. A process is considered to be a leader iff
the state is 0. For any process pi, we use the symbols S, L,
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Fig. 4. Network topology where Ghosh's mutual exclusion algorithm
works.
Fig. 5. An SMV program for Ghosh's mutual exclusion algorithm
(m  3; n  6).
TABLE 2
Verification Results and Performance for Ghosh's Mutual Exclusion Algorithm
and R to denote its state, the state of its left neighbor piÿ1,
and the state of its right neighbor pi1, respectively. Let
x  gL; S and y  gS;R, where
ga; b  n a  bbÿ a mod n otherwise:

Then the leader election algorithm is as follows:
. process pii  0; 1; 2;    ; nÿ 1
if (x  y and y  n) fS : S  1 mod n; g
if (x < y) fS : S  1 mod n; g:
We define a global state to be legitimate iff 1) in that
state, there is exactly one process (say pi) such that pi is a
leader and other nÿ 1 processes are not a leader, and 2) this
property will always hold at any state in every computation
starting with the state. A leader election algorithm is
considered self-stabilizing iff the system that runs the
algorithm reaches a legitimate state regardless of the initial
state. Note that the closure property is already taken into
consideration in the definition of the legitimate states.
Now let leaderi be the predicate that is true iff only pi is a
leader. By definition, the legitimate states are the states in
which AG leader0 _ AG leader1 _    _ AG leadernÿ1 holds.
The self-stabilizing property can then be written in CTL as
AF (AG leader0 _ AG leader1 _    _ AG leadernÿ1). Fig. 6
shows an SMV program that describes this algorithm when
n  3.
Although the algorithm assumes the c-daemon and rings
of primal size, we verified the algorithm in the case of the
d-daemon and/or rings of composite size, in order to
demonstrate how SMV works when a given correctness
property does not hold. Table 3 shows the results of the
verification. (Note that Huang proved that no uniform,
deterministic self-stabilizing leader algorithm exists if n is
composite [13].) These results show that the algorithm does
not work under the d-daemon even if n is prime. When an
SMV program does not meet a given property to be
checked, SMV provides a computation path on which the
property does not hold. In the case of n  3 and the
d-daemon, for example, SMV detected the following
computation, which never reaches a legitimate state.
2; 2; 2 !fp1;p2;p3g0; 0; 0 !fp1;p2;p3g2; 2; 2 !fp1;p2;p3g0; 0; 0 !fp1;p2;p3g   
3Table 3 also shows the performance of the model
checking procedure and the number of the global states,
which is nn since each process has n local states in this
algorithm.
5.3 Example 3: Ring Orientation
The next problem we consider is ring orientation, which is
the problem of orienting a ring in one direction where each
node has no sense of direction. We assume that each
process pi cannot tell which of its two adjacent processes is
piÿ1 or pi1 and that the ring is uniform as in the previous
example.
During the execution of a ring orientation algorithm,
each process chooses one of its adjacent processes as the
forward process and the other as the backward process. We
denote the forward process of pi by Forwpi.
Let AP1 and AP2 denote the two processes adjacent to pi.
We assume that each process pi has a variable dir 2 fB;Fg
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Fig. 6. An SMV program for the leader election algorithm (n  3).
TABLE 3
Verification Results and Performance for the Leader Election Algorithm
to represent its decision in such a way that Forwpi  AP1
iff dir  B and Forwpi  AP2 iff dir  F . Then we say
that a ring is oriented iff exactly one of the following two
conditions holds: (Condition 1) Forwpi  piÿ1 for all
i  0; 1;    ; nÿ 1, or (Condition 2) Forwpi  pi1 for all
i  0; 1;    ; nÿ 1.
In [11], Hoepman proposed uniform self-stabilizing ring-
orientation algorithms for rings of odd size both for the
state-reading model and the link-register model. In this
paper, we take the algorithm for the state-reading model. In
the algorithm, each process has two Boolean variables, S
and T , in addition to dir. The following is such an algorithm
where S1 and T1 denote the values of S and T of AP1, and
similarly, S2 and T2 denote the values of S and T of AP2.
. process pii  0; 1; 2;    ; nÿ 1
if S1  S2fS : :S1; T : 1; g
if S1  S  :S2 and :T1  T  T2  1 fS : :S;
T : 0; dir : F ; g
if :S1  S  S2 and T1  T  :T2  1 fS : :S;
T : 0; dir : B; g
if ((S1  S  :S2 and T1  T ) or (:S1  S  S2
and T  T2)) fT : :T ; g.
In the ring orientation problem, a global state is
legitimate iff 1) in that state the ring is oriented in one
direction, i.e., one of the above two conditions holds, and 2)
the ring will be oriented in the same direction at any state in
every computation starting with that state. A ring orienta-
tion algorithm is self-stabilizing iff it reaches a legitimate
state from any initial state.
Let Condition1 (Condition2) be true iff Condition 1
(Condition 2) holds. The legitimate states can then be
defined as those where AG Condition1 _ AG Condition2
holds. Hence, the self-stabilizing property is written in CTL
as AF (AG Condition1 _ AG Condition2).
Fig. 7 shows an SMV program that represents the ring
orientation algorithm when n  3. As stated above, each
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Fig. 7. An SMV program for the ring orientation algorithm [11] (n  3).
TABLE 4
Verification Results and Performance for the Ring-Orientation Algorithm [11]
process pi does not know which of its two adjacent
processes, AP1 and AP2, is piÿ1 and which is pi1. This
fact means that it is necessary to consider two cases for each
process pi in verification, that is, the case where AP1  piÿ1
and AP2  pi1 and the case where AP1  pi1 and
AP2  piÿ1. Thus, we have to check a total of 2n cases to
verify the algorithm.
In order to handle the 2n cases at a time, we add a special
variable AP1_pc(AP1 pc) to each process in the SMV
program shown in Fig. 7. In the SMV program, the variable
takes a value of either -1 or 1. If AP1 pc for process pi has a
value of -1, then AP1  piÿ1 and AP2  pi1; otherwise,
AP1  pi1 and AP2  piÿ1. By allowing nondeterministic
choice of the initial value of AP1 pc, we can verify all the 2n
cases at one try. Note that Forwpi  piÿ1 holds iff dir 
B ^AP1 pc  ÿ1 or dir  F ^AP1 pc  1. Let predicate
desi be true iff Forwpi  piÿ1 holds. Then Condition 1 can
be written as des0 ^ des1 ^    ^ desnÿ1, while Condition 2 is
given by :des0 ^ :des1 ^    ^ :desnÿ1.
Although the algorithm assumes the c-daemon and rings
with an odd number of processes, we verified the algorithm
in the case of the d-daemon and/or rings with an even
number of processes. Table 4 shows the results of
verification. Note that no uniform and deterministic self-
stabilizing ring orientation algorithm exists if n is even [14].
In [14], it is also proven that no uniform and deterministic
self-stabilizing ring orientation algorithm exists under the
d-daemon in the state-reading model. As shown in the
table, the verification results are consistent with this
impossibility result.
This table also shows the performance of the model
checking procedure for this example in terms of the
verification time and the maximum number of OBDD
nodes used at any given time. The table also contains the
size of the OBDD for the transition relation and the number
of the global states of the system, which is 8n since each
process has eight local states.
5.4 Example 4: Ring Orientation in the Link-Register
Model
The four algorithms discussed above assume the state-
reading model, in which processes can read the states of
other processes directly. Here we take an algorithm that
works in the link-register model. The algorithm, which is
proposed by Umemoto et al. in [26], is also for ring
orientation. This algorithm is designed to run on rings of
odd size under the d-daemon. (Note that no deterministic
ring orientation algorithm exists when n is even.) As
described before, communication is done by means of
registers in the link-register model. Since we assume that
the topology of the system is a ring, there are a total of 2n
registers (i.e., R0;1; R1;0; R1;2; R2;1;    ; Rnÿ1;0; R0;nÿ1).
Each process has two adjacent processes AP1 and AP2.
For each adjacent process AP1 (AP2), we denote its output
register by RO1 (RO2) and its input register by RI1 (RI2).
Fig. 8 shows the algorithm. As shown in the figure, this
algorithm works according to two sets of five rules. The
state of each component (process and register) is a tuple
label; dir, where label 2 f0; 1; Hg and dir 2 fF;Bg. Thus
each component has six states. Processes selected to run
read RI1 and RI2, change their own state, and update RO1
and RO2 atomically. In Fig. 8, instruction ªreadR; vº reads
input register R and stores its contents in v, and
ªwriteR; vº writes the contents of local variable v to
output register R.
Fig. 9 shows an SMV program that describes the ring-
orientation algorithm under the d-daemon. In the SMV
program, module p specifies the behavior of each process pi
and its output registers Ri;iÿ1 and Ri;i1. We use the same
technique as the previous example in order to model the
fact that for each process pi two distinct situations can
occur, that is, AP1 can be either piÿ1 or pi1.
Table 5 shows the results of verifying this algorithm. The
results indicate that the algorithm does not work under the
d-daemon. By examining a counterexample that SMV
produced, we found that there is a fair computation that
never reaches the legitimate states. Fig. 10 shows part of one
such a computation. Here for every process pi, AP1  pi1
and AP2  piÿ1 are assumed. In this part of the computa-
tion, g1 and g13 are the same global state, and there is no
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Fig. 8. The ring orientation algorithm [26].
process that is not selected to run. Thus, one can see that
g1 g2    g12 g1 g2    g12 g1 g2    is a fair computation and
does not reach any legitimate state.
We investigated the cause of such livelock and found
that it may occur when Rule 2a and Rule 2b, which are the
only rules that can change the value of dir, are applied to
two neighboring processes at the same time. In [26], livelock
freedom is proved based on the fact that such a case never
occurs (Lemma 4). Therefore, the proof does not hold for the
original algorithm. For example, consider the transition
g2 ! g3 in Fig. 10. In this transition, p0 changes its direction
according to Rule 2a, while for p1, two rules are applied
consecutively. First, Rule 5a is applied, which means that
label  0 and dir  F hold temporarily. Then Rule 2b is
applied and the state of p2 finally becomes H;B.
One way to prevent the occurrence of such a situation is
to ensure that no more than one rule is applied to each
process at a time, and this makes Lemma 4 in [26] hold.
Fig. 11 shows the corrected algorithm. (Only lines different
from Fig. 8 are shown.) For example, only Rule 4a can be
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Fig. 9. An SMV program for the ring orientation algorithm [26] (n  3).
applied to p1 at g2 in the corrected algorithm. Using the
proposed approach, we verified that this algorithm works
correctly under the d-daemon when n  3. Fig. 12 shows
the SMV program that represents the algorithm. (In this
figure, only next(label) and next(dir) are shown
since the remaining part is the same as in Fig. 9, except that
tmp_label and tmp_dir can be omitted.)
6 VERIFYING SELF-STABILIZATION USING SPIN
For comparison purposes, we present the results of using
another model checker, called SPIN [12], to verify a self-
stabilizing algorithm in this section. SPIN is a very fast
model checker based on explicit state enumeration, and like
SMV, it is widely available.
In addition to various techniques for efficient verifica-
tion, SPIN incorporates a different state reduction approach
than symbolic representation. This approach, called partial
order reduction, has been proven to be very successful in
verifying concurrent systems and communication protocols
[8], [12], [27]. It is based on the observation that the validity
of a given correctness property is often insensitive to the
order in which current and independently executed events
are interleaved. Given an initial state, these techniques
generate a reduced set of reachable states that is indis-
tinguishable for the given property, instead of generating
the whole reachable state space.
The input language for SPIN is called PROMELA; Fig. 13
shows a PROMELA program for the Dijkstra's K-state
mutual exclusion algorithm under the c-daemon. This
program is a modification of the one proposed in [23].
Since the original program only modeled the algorithm
under the condition that an initial state is given, we added
if statements to enforce each process to nondeterministically
change its state in the first move of the process. Also, an
initial state must be specified in a PROMELA program,
therefore this program sets the initial state of each process
to 0. Due to these modifications, however, the algorithm is
allowed to start with any global state. Unfortunately, the
modifications do not preserve the closure property. In the
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TABLE 5
Verification Results and Performance for the Ring-Orientation Algorithm [26]
Fig. 10. Livelock.
Fig. 11. The corrected algorithm.
rest of this section, therefore, we limit our discussion to
verification of the convergence property.
SPIN adopts Linear Time Logic (LTL) [18] to specify the
property to be verified. Since the CTL formula used for
representing the legitimate states of the K-state algorithm is
not expressible in LTL, to signify the convergence property
we use LTL formula AF legitimate, where
legitimate 
_
0inÿ1
privi ^
^
j 6i
0jnÿ1
:privj ^
^
0inÿ1
F privi:
(For the formal definition of LTL, the readers are referred to,
for example, [4].)
We applied SPIN to the K-state algorithm with and
without enabling partial order reduction. Table 6 shows the
verification times of SPIN. An NA in the table indicates that
the verification was not completed due to memory shortage.
The results show that the use of SPIN is not feasible unless
the number of processes is small, and that it is more
vulnerable to the state explosion problem than symbolic
model checking. It can also be seen that for this example
partial order reduction did not work effectively and even
worsened the performance. By comparing the results with
those presented in Table 1, we conclude that the proposed
method is superior in terms of verification performance.
Nevertheless, we expect that SPIN can be more
useful than SMV for verification of self-stabilizing
communication protocols (e.g., [10], [24]), because typically
in such protocols, only two processes are involved, and
communications between processes are implemented by
message passing. In SPIN, such communication can easily
be modeled by using communication commands in
PROMELA. Although this topic is beyond the scope of
the paper, we consider it one of the possible directions of
future study.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed to use symbolic model checking
to verify distributed algorithms against the self-stabilizing
property. We presented an approach in which the SMV
system can be used for this purpose, and showed the
effectiveness of the proposed approach, by using it to verify
several algorithms. During the verification process, we
found an error in one of these algorithms. Due to the nature
of model checking, the proposed approach is applicable
only when the number of processes is modest. However, we
believe that this approach is useful for designing self-
stabilizing algorithms, since, as demonstrated in this paper,
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Fig. 12. An SMV program for the corrected algorithm.
Fig. 13. A PROMELA program for the K-state algorithm under the
c-daemon (n  3;K  4).
it can help designers to detect and correct errors in the
algorithms.
There are many directions for future work. For example,
applicability of model checking techniques other than
symbolic model checking need to be further examined; in
particular, the use of symmetry seems likely to be effective
for state reduction, because self-stabilizing systems appear-
ing in the literature frequently exhibit considerable sym-
metry (uniform systems [11], [13], [14], [26] are such typical
examples).
Although model checking has an advantage because it
can be performed automatically, there will always be
situations where theorem proving is required for complete
verification, since model checking can only be applied to
finite state systems. A new research direction in formal
verification attempts to combine model checking and
mechanical theorem proving (e.g., [21]). Application of this
new approach to self-stabilizing systems also deserves
further study.
Recently, some unique techniques have been proposed to
reason about self-stabilizing systems; for example, in [25],
control theory is applied for this purpose. In [1], the use of
string rewriting systems is suggested to model and verify
self-stabilizing rings. Extension of these approaches, in-
cluding their automation, is also an interesting research
topic.
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